Supplying the Syrian Rebels

Recently, President Obama announced that he is beginning to make preparations to send lethal weapons to the Free Syrian Army. In order to prepare for this potential undertaking, the President is increasing his interaction and cooperation with our allies and partners in the region. In particular, President Obama is attempting to engage Russian President Vladimir Putin, who supports the Assad regime. Obama is trying to convince Putin that the probable use of chemical should lead him to reconsider his support for the Assad regime. There have been recent reports that suggest chemical weapons have been used in Syria, but the President has been slow to react to these claims in an effort to not react to quickly to the situation. If anything, the President wants to prevent a reaction similar to the one that was witnessed before the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Support from the international community is absolutely essential, if the United States is to attempt to supply the rebels with arms and munitions. 

 Unfortunately, many analysts believe that simply providing the rebels with arms will not topple the Assad regime. The President hopes to bolster the war effort by sending weaponry such as surface-to-air missiles, which will help to bring down the Assad regime, without a large scale U.S. military effort. A major problem with this plan is that many people do not believe that the Assad regime is on the verge of collapse because the regime retains a decent sized army, air superiority, and chemical weapons. Increasing arms shipments will not be enough to overcome these advantages. Allied air power, undoubtedly led by the U.S., will have to take the lead in overcoming these advantages. Christopher Harmer, a former naval officer, stated that the United States could supply the rebels with radio systems, AT-4's, Javelin's, and armored vehicles, but that these systems would only increase the potential for prolonged stalemate. Currently, the only feasible option seems to be the establishment of a no-fly zone in the region, which would blunt Assad's air superiority. Even this option is difficult because the air force has been spread thin by recent conflicts. Figures estimate that if a ground contingent is needed to secure chemical weapons, 70,000 U.S. soldiers will be needed.

There are many logistical problems that would come to light if we continue to increase our involvement in the region by either further supplying the Syrian rebels, establishing a no fly zone, or putting boots on the ground. First, supplying the Syrian army would prove difficult, given its possible links to al-Qaida. There is an inherent problem with giving munitions such as the AT-4 and Javelin to Syrian rebels because there is no way to ensure that those weapons systems will not be given to terrorists to be used against our forces in the future. The United States does not want to see a repeat of Afghanistan, in which it supplied the Mujaheddin, who in turn used those weapons against the U.S. after it sent forces to the country. Supplying rebels with these weapons systems could prove to be a fatal mistake because these weapons systems could then be turned against us. Another inherent problem with supplying the Free Syrian Army is that the U.S. would be forced to pour more an immense amount of money into an endeavor, despite the fact that it can not adequately supply its own military. Sequestration is currently is full effect and our military braces for cuts that may possibly make it unprepared for future conflict. Despite this, the government wants to take more money and pour it into supplying a rebel military force. This begs us to ask the question, how can we supply a foreign military force, if we are having trouble supplying our own?

Direct intervention, via the use of a no fly zone or a ground contingent, also has many inherent logistical problems that have been discussed by the Air Force. Our military is currently spread very thin, given that we are still involved in Afghanistan and in the process of a strategic rebalance to Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. military finds itself spread across the globe and as we try move forces to Asia, we may find it difficult to provide the necessary logistical requirements to our forces that could potentially be stationed in Syria. We do have a large supply network that we can draw from, but we can not be everywhere at once. In addition to this, we will find it difficult to sustain these operations on a decreased budget. Many people tend to forget the costs associated with establishing a no fly zone by using aircraft stationed in various countries such as Turkey and off the coast. Costs of fuel, maintenance, and munitions for these aircraft will be high as we increase our logistical footprint in the region.  Sending a ground contingent is also hard to imagine given the amount of funding and logistics that would be required. Deploying troops to Syria would require the U.S. to undertake a massive theater opening effort through the use of its sustainment brigades, and increase our logistical presence in a region that we have been attempting to draw away from. Sadly, most people tend to forget about the logistics that is required to drive these operations, which includes the diplomatic nightmare that the U.S. would have to deal with countries such as Israel, Iran, and Russia. Increased involvement in Syria will prove costly for U.S. forces in logistical requirements and potentially in U.S. lives.