Logistical partnering with host nations

This would have been done much earlier but I along with 2^nd and part of 3^rd regiment spent some time in central area being mass punished for two printers that found themselves falling from Ike barracks onto the duty vehicle.  Despite the interruption, it really boils down to logistics and not behavior.  If the Corps had proper supply, field services, maintenance, transportation, distribution… the company printers could sustain the Corps and there would be no personnel printers to exit windows in Ike barracks at 2330 on a Thursday night.  However, I digress.



Cause nothing says logistics like fine grapes.

In South Korea, senior U.S. and Republic of Korea (RoK) Army officials are discussing not just leading front-line formations but the combined logistics operations that enable any operation. Building competent Soldiers and leaders within allied nations is often front-page news yet without proper logistical support our allies come to rely on the United States for logistical support. The danger in building modern forces with all their logistical requirements in nations that cannot organically support such units is high. The abilities to generate, transport, sustain, and redeploy must match the forces fielded by an ally even if that means focusing less on combat strength and more on logistical abilities. Otherwise, an ally will be unable to project force or provide support without direct assistance from U.S. assets.

 

Arguably, the United States has always lacked in developing the logistical capabilities of its allies throughout history. The South Vietnamese could not support their forces and forward deployed units as the United States withdrew after the hasty implementation of the Vietnamization plan leaving the modern tanks and weapons without fuel and supplies. Throughout the Vietnam War U.S. forces were expected to do the bulk of the fighting and all of the logistical support. When Vietnamization was implemented both those trends reveresed drastically leaving the ARVN without the structures to logistically support its forces.

 

 

 

In modern conflict, we see the Afghan Army forced to abandon combat outposts (COP) as they lack the air assets that form the backbone of U.S. logistical efforts in Afghanistan. As U.S. helicopters leave Afghani Soldiers must abandon COPs like Warheight, Keating, Kamu, and Kherwar because they cannot bring ammunition and food to Soldiers stationed there. Replacing the range and speed of U.S. helicopters with donkeys has proved unable to support austere COPs and forward basings. The prospect of holding a vast country like Afghanistan without a strong logistical base to support border and internal security operations is bleak. Once U.S. aid and logistical support stops the Afghan Army will likely be limited to larger cities and more populated regions with access to paved roads meaning most of the country will be open to radical factions and criminal elements.

 

In the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan, we often talk about the need for a complete plan to include and exit strategy after we have won yet the logistical partnerships are still left out of the big picture planning process. Soldiers have been stationed in Korea since 1950 yet in over 50 years, a partnership in logistics and enabling their forces to sustain themselves organically has not been attempted until now.

 

Lastly, even our European allies lack the logistical abilities to sustain operations throughout the world over time meaning they too must rely on U.S. forces logistical structure when offering assistance in a conflict or operation.  In the era of sequestration and budget shortfalls, it is no longer an option to give the Canadians a ride to Afghanistan along with most European nations.  Partnering with our allies to build host nation logistical capacities will allow independent action and create larger logistical networks that the United States can utilize in times of war and conflict.