Fuel across Afghanistan - Host Nation Truck (HNT) problems

HNTs carrying fuel are escorted to FOBs in Afghanistan during a resupply mission.  Many more are visible in the distance.

Last May, Army Sustainment magazine published an article online detailing the primary problems of transporting fuel across Afghanistan.  In the article, MAJ Jonathan McDougal pinned the primary problems on “host-nation trucking system challenges, including pilferage, maintenance problems, and life support issues.”  Almost a year later, Army Sustainment once again reflected on the efforts to improve fuel distribution effectiveness.  In the recent March-April version of Army Sustainment magazine (not published online yet), MAJ Jeremiah S. O’Connor targeted fuel capacity and distribution velocity as the key contributing factors.  Between both of these articles, a similar issue arose: the effectiveness of host-nation trucks.

It’s been said that “an army marches on its stomach”, but armies today are marching on a different type of stomach.  Forage and fodder, which kept horses on the move in pre-WWII conflicts, has been replaced with POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants), which keeps all transportation and mounted combat vehicles on the move.  Technically, our army today is still marching on its stomach, but these stomachs are the incredibly hungry fuel tanks of each of our vehicles.

Old school stockpiling days of the Vietnam War.  Air Assault!

Because of this vital need for fuel, it is important that our fuel delivery systems in Afghanistan be reliable.  As the army has shifted to a more just-in-time approach, abandoning the just-in-case fuel stockpiling days that ran up through the Vietnam War and even the Gulf War, it is crucial that fuel supplies be delivered on time.  The problem is that the HNTs delivering fuel across Afghanistan are incredibly unreliable.  MAJ O’Connor stated that “HNTs often arrived with less than 90% of the uploaded quantity, arrived late, or did not arrive at all” and that “although some trucks would deliver in less than seven days [which was quite a large time frame for only a few hours traveling], it was impossible to predict when they would arrive”.

Another problem associated with HNTs.

In order to meet the logistical requirements of forces in Afghanistan, a solution had to be found to address the unreliability of HNTs.  One option was providing military escorts for HNT deliveries.  The problem with this option was that it diverted critical convoy security crews and other resources in order to deliver a simple bulk commodity (fuel).  Another option was to order excess fuel, however this would create chokepoints of backed up HNTs at bases, and would make the bulk quantity of HNTs an easy target for enemy forces.  Yet another option was to use military fuel tankers, however this option simply used a tremendous amount of military resources and exposed service members to unnecessary risks as crew members.  The overarching problem was that none of these solutions addressed long-term disruptive risks caused by local hazards (HNT driver strikes, religious holidays, and local politics).

The solution for these long-term disruptive risks was to increase the capacity of bases and supporting bases, and incorporate a DLA-E Distribution system.  The DLA-E (DefenseLogistics Agency – Energy) system only delivered to sites that had a capacity of greater than 1 million gallons.  By increasing the capacity of smaller bases, and allowing a DLA-E system to deliver fuel in 30-60 day quantities, rather than using HNTs on a weekly basis, local bases reduced HNT requirements by hundreds of trucks per month.  DLA-E trucks were also superior in quality and had two download nozzles, which reduced download time by half.  This resulted in “an immediate reduction in force protection requirements and an increase in throughput capacity”.  

Overall, the solution to HNT issues seemed simple: increase the storage capacity and use a better system.

"So you're just going to ditch me?"

This solution seems to carry with it certain implications for the future.  First and foremost, these larger fuel capacities carry with it reduced mobility, so the gradual reduction of forces is being met with a desire to maintain effectiveness of forces still currently operating.  Eventually we will be dealing with removing some very stubborn fuel storage systems, but it seems it will be worth the cost to keep things running smoothly during active operations.  Secondly, this system is operated under the DLA-E's leash and, as a result, prevents Afghanistan from developing its own system to deliver POL effectively.  This issue will certainly arise once the system is shut down and all US forces leave the country.  Lastly, this system still does not tackle the root issues of HNTs in general, and simply shifts to a different system.  This issue might not matter for our current operations, but it still carries significant risk for Afghan-led follow-on operations.

“Six bells and all is well. Another week shot to hell. Another week in my little gray cell. Another week in which to excel. Oh, hell." - The Sunday Night Poop (Old Corps knowledge.... The Corps Has)

Prisoner #8639-2, reporting back to my little gray cell.