Starting From Scratch- Afghan Logistics

“It’s hard to break something that’s not built.” This statement made by Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell, head of NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTMA), is the summation of the Afghan Logistical Unit. The Army Times posted an article on the lack/ non-existence of Afghan supply, called "Army building Afghan logistics from 'scratch'".

So where to start? What should be the basis for creating an Afghan supported logistical system? Do we need to go ALLLLLLLLLLL the way back to Neoplean times, how about World War II, or maybe we should be so generous to let them copycat our supposed RML (Revolution in Military Logistics) in which we have employed new tactics and technology in order to "generate, sustain, and transport" in terms of logistics. As General Dennis Reimer once stated, "There can be no revolution in military affairs without having a revolution in military logistics." This statements seems to hold the same standard over any army, including the Afghan army. Much like our logistical revolution, there is a science to it all. I'd say it begins with the good old fashion TLP's:

1. Receive the Mission. Okay check Afghan logistics.
2. (Skip Warno) Make a Tentative Plan.
3. Initiate Movement.
4. Recon.
5.Complete the Plan.
6. Issue Order.
7. Supervise.

Now that we understand the problem, the most effort and concentration should be focused around making a plan structured for the "Afghan" army, not the United States Army. They live in a different setting, culture, and basic way of life than the structure of America, with less than 15% of the Afghan Army recruits being literate, the simplest tasks of logistics will seem near impossible. So it must be re-stated, "make a plan structured for the 'Afghan' army." The supervise part is also key because this will be a true learning experience for most. The basics of water and food distribution as well as fuel to Afghan units have only been implemented by the most senior Afghan soldiers having done so during the Soviet invasion.

In order to completely remove American presence in Afghanistan and hand it over to their forces, it all starts with logistics. "Logistics is probably the most complicated thing an army does because there are a lot of different pieces that have to come together for a logistics system to work," stated Col. John Ferrari. The time and effort in order to structure and teach such an intricate system will take the longest. It's easier to teach someone how to pull a trigger and shoot, it's not so easy to make generate, transport, supply, manufacture, maintain, and distribute that gun so the soldier can shoot.

It's also about starting early. One problem the Iraqi effort faced was the length it takes to rebuild a military's supply. An army is more than just people. You need items all the way from shoe laces to ammo to food to batteries. Simply giving the Afghan army the equipment and space is not the answer. Training the soldiers to understand the concepts of logistical time and inventory is the answer.

We are headed in the right direction in assisting build of Afghan logistics. Helping Afghan officers understand the negatives of hoarding, as well as teaching them the importance supply and consistent resupply, this all starts with getting rid of bad habits. Recently in 2009, the coalition has at least helped the new Afghan recruits read and write to at least the U.S. first grade level. Although it may not seem like much of a push towards education, at least they (Afghan enlisted) will know 1 + 1 = logistics.

The Second Order Consequenses of Sequestration

The latest threat to the armed forces is budget sequestration, and while the military is already finding ways to save money, it needs to be looking closer at the long-term effects of the policies it is about to put into place.

The Army has already managed to save seventy-one million dollars during fiscal year 2013 by diverting supplies from air transportation to surface transportation, but while grounding aircraft can save money in the short term it can be very expensive in the long run.  During the Clinton budget-balancing of 1994, the Navy grounded several squadron’s of aircraft to help pay for peacekeeping missions.  The problem with this is the cost to get grounded aircraft operational again.  As the budget shrinks, things like maintenance are cut in order to save money immediately.  The Navy has already announced plans to slash its maintenance budget by 40% during the second half of the fiscal year, cutting maintenance to 11 ships out of Norfolk Virginia alone.  Once the money comes back, however, and you want to use those grounded aircraft, the cost of getting them operational again is severely more than providing the routine maintenance would have been.  Retired Vice Adm. Peter Daly, chief executive officer of the U.S. Naval Institute, compared it to taking care of your car: “"You might think you're saving money by not maintaining your car, but in the end, if you skip that 60,000-mile tune-up and end up losing a timing belt, you'll be sitting with a $2,400 bill to replace your engine. That's not very smart."

A potential bright side to sequestration could be the coalition and joint programs that the budget will force.  The Patriot Missile system is widely acknowledged as being so good only because it was the combined effort of 11 nations who when working together were able to create a much better system at costs much lower than when the US takes on a project alone.  Likewise, this could also mean that if we are forced to partner with other countries in order to create new technologies, our products may again be better and cheaper than if we worked on our own.  Provided, of course, that we find ourselves willing to share this technology.

Precision Munitions Transform Logistics

We often watch footage of Predator Drones, GBUs, and Excalibur 155m rounds but the underlying laser and precision technologies generally only equate to better ways of killing.  How can precision technology change logistics?

The container delivery system (CDS) drops and they have been extremely important in Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm/Shield, and Afghanistan. Early in its development CDS was tweaked from the end of the Korean War to the beginning of The Vietnam War by adding the delayed opening of parachutes and the Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System (AWADS). Essentially poor weather and visibility became good things as they concealed aircraft, jumpers, and equipment from small arms fire instead of degrading drop accuracy. Post Vietnam the CDS drop is virtually unchanged; a skid board of ¾” plywood and energy-dissipating material (aka cardboard), an A22 container to rig equipment no taller than 82”, one cargo parachute, one pilot parachute, and various expendable supplies (FM 10-500-3 Rigging Containers).



Vietnam Then

Afghanistan Now

 

 

 

 

 

 

Enter the new Precision Airdrop systems and the future of CDS drops for both the Regular Army and Special Operations. The Guided Parafoil Air Delivery System (GPADS) is already a reality and comes in extra light (XL), light (L), medium (M), and heavy (H). All this equates to one system with four parafoil setups that allow payloads between 250lbs and 42,000lbs from an altitude of up to 30,000ft. The parafoil also imparts a high glide ratio that enables the system to travel distances up to 100 kilometers much like a glider would. The guidance system or Airborne Guidance Unit allows the exact drop zone MGRS coordinates to be plugged in or they may be remotely controlled; allowing drops to be placed within 75m of a point target. FXC Corporation and Guardian Parachute produce the entire aforementioned system and are currently adding built in propulsion and other upgrades while other companies produce lesser systems already in use in Afghanistan and abroad.

Note parafoil size is dependent on load.

GPADS in action!

Look at how on demand logistics has transformed the civilian world, Precision Drop technology is poised to do the same for the military.  With GPADS a HALO team can enter a country undetected and their heavy gear or even vehicles will touch down within minutes and within 75m of their drop zone or anywhere they designate.  Line units also benefit in that they can pre-designate specific packages and have them loaded on an aircraft on station so resupply is always less than five minutes away.  Because the GPADS can travel up to 100 kilometers several units can be supported by a single aircraft that can do the CDS drop in a central location as the GPADS can navigate to the drop zone independently or with direction.  The high altitude and 100 kilometer range of GPADS allows transport aircraft to out fly all anti-air threats both horizontally and vertically leaving only air to air threats which given our fighter supremacy are none. 

 

Even high intensity conventional warfare can utilize GPADS as standard packages can be rigged and kept aloft at all times meaning resupply is a matter of minutes for any ground unit.  More importantly, the Abrams tank (and all armor) may be able to out drive (think WWII Patton) it's land based supply lines but it can't out fly them.  The infamous refuel on the move (ROM) operation can be reduced from fuelers, convoys, and security to a totally  organic operation that can be conducted alongside munitions and other resupply via GPADS.  

 

Though not all supply lines can be replaced by GPADS it is easy to see how it would save lives in places like Afghanistan where ground logistics trains suffer heavy losses from IED's and ambush.  GPADS will also allow extremely small footprints for light and special operations forces deployed to Africa and South America on train and assist missions.  It's certainly time for the CDS drop to get an update and the GPADS will change the way we use CDS drops and take rapid aerial resupply into the future.

Aviation and Sequestration

In his recent testimony to the Congress’ Armed Services Committees, Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno stated that the future of Army Aviation is in danger due to the impending budget cuts brought about by Sequestration.  

General Odierno asserted that the budget cuts would drastically reduce the effectiveness of Army Aviation, sending pilots and crews into the fight with “a hell of a lot less capability.”  Although Odierno did not go into graphic detail about the cuts that Army Aviation would face, he did predict that the Army Center for Aviation Excellence at Fort Rucker, the Army’s training center for pilots, would be hit particularly hard.  Early estimates indicate that the Center would ultimately stand to lose 500 student pilot slots, approximately 37,000 hours of flight training, and 250 grounded helicopters as a direct result of Sequestration’s cuts. For years, the Center has worked to ensure that the training process is as efficient as possible, but this loss would certainly undo those efforts. This would be a huge blow to aviators, crews, and rotary wing platforms that have been already been characterized as “aging and overworked.”

One of the platforms in most dire need of upgrade, the Bell OH-58 Kiowa, has been on Army leader’s radar for quite some time. While Aviation staff last viewed potential replacements for the Kiowa in June of 2012, the latest budget cuts are likely to present another setback for updating a platform that has been in continuous service since 1969.  

This news is sharply is contrasted reports that the Army has inked two new production contracts with Lockheed Martin earlier this month, to continue refitting the Apache platform. On February 13^th, Lockheed announced that they had received a total of $161 million in contracts to upgrade the Modernized Target Acquisition Designation Sight/ Pilot Night Vision Sensor (M-TADS/PNVS) systems on the Apache. While the M-TADS/PNVS Director offered that “these contracts demonstrate the customer’s commitment to ensuring our soldiers have superior capabilities as they carry out their missions,” one has two wonder exactly where the commitment to superior capabilities and sequestration will come to blows. The Army’s Chief of Staff has testified before Congress about the potential inability to generate pilots. What good is an Apache without an aviator?