Fuel across Afghanistan - Host Nation Truck (HNT) problems

HNTs carrying fuel are escorted to FOBs in Afghanistan during a resupply mission.  Many more are visible in the distance.

Last May, Army Sustainment magazine published an article online detailing the primary problems of transporting fuel across Afghanistan.  In the article, MAJ Jonathan McDougal pinned the primary problems on “host-nation trucking system challenges, including pilferage, maintenance problems, and life support issues.”  Almost a year later, Army Sustainment once again reflected on the efforts to improve fuel distribution effectiveness.  In the recent March-April version of Army Sustainment magazine (not published online yet), MAJ Jeremiah S. O’Connor targeted fuel capacity and distribution velocity as the key contributing factors.  Between both of these articles, a similar issue arose: the effectiveness of host-nation trucks.

It’s been said that “an army marches on its stomach”, but armies today are marching on a different type of stomach.  Forage and fodder, which kept horses on the move in pre-WWII conflicts, has been replaced with POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants), which keeps all transportation and mounted combat vehicles on the move.  Technically, our army today is still marching on its stomach, but these stomachs are the incredibly hungry fuel tanks of each of our vehicles.

Old school stockpiling days of the Vietnam War.  Air Assault!

Because of this vital need for fuel, it is important that our fuel delivery systems in Afghanistan be reliable.  As the army has shifted to a more just-in-time approach, abandoning the just-in-case fuel stockpiling days that ran up through the Vietnam War and even the Gulf War, it is crucial that fuel supplies be delivered on time.  The problem is that the HNTs delivering fuel across Afghanistan are incredibly unreliable.  MAJ O’Connor stated that “HNTs often arrived with less than 90% of the uploaded quantity, arrived late, or did not arrive at all” and that “although some trucks would deliver in less than seven days [which was quite a large time frame for only a few hours traveling], it was impossible to predict when they would arrive”.

Another problem associated with HNTs.

In order to meet the logistical requirements of forces in Afghanistan, a solution had to be found to address the unreliability of HNTs.  One option was providing military escorts for HNT deliveries.  The problem with this option was that it diverted critical convoy security crews and other resources in order to deliver a simple bulk commodity (fuel).  Another option was to order excess fuel, however this would create chokepoints of backed up HNTs at bases, and would make the bulk quantity of HNTs an easy target for enemy forces.  Yet another option was to use military fuel tankers, however this option simply used a tremendous amount of military resources and exposed service members to unnecessary risks as crew members.  The overarching problem was that none of these solutions addressed long-term disruptive risks caused by local hazards (HNT driver strikes, religious holidays, and local politics).

The solution for these long-term disruptive risks was to increase the capacity of bases and supporting bases, and incorporate a DLA-E Distribution system.  The DLA-E (DefenseLogistics Agency – Energy) system only delivered to sites that had a capacity of greater than 1 million gallons.  By increasing the capacity of smaller bases, and allowing a DLA-E system to deliver fuel in 30-60 day quantities, rather than using HNTs on a weekly basis, local bases reduced HNT requirements by hundreds of trucks per month.  DLA-E trucks were also superior in quality and had two download nozzles, which reduced download time by half.  This resulted in “an immediate reduction in force protection requirements and an increase in throughput capacity”.  

Overall, the solution to HNT issues seemed simple: increase the storage capacity and use a better system.

"So you're just going to ditch me?"

This solution seems to carry with it certain implications for the future.  First and foremost, these larger fuel capacities carry with it reduced mobility, so the gradual reduction of forces is being met with a desire to maintain effectiveness of forces still currently operating.  Eventually we will be dealing with removing some very stubborn fuel storage systems, but it seems it will be worth the cost to keep things running smoothly during active operations.  Secondly, this system is operated under the DLA-E's leash and, as a result, prevents Afghanistan from developing its own system to deliver POL effectively.  This issue will certainly arise once the system is shut down and all US forces leave the country.  Lastly, this system still does not tackle the root issues of HNTs in general, and simply shifts to a different system.  This issue might not matter for our current operations, but it still carries significant risk for Afghan-led follow-on operations.

“Six bells and all is well. Another week shot to hell. Another week in my little gray cell. Another week in which to excel. Oh, hell." - The Sunday Night Poop (Old Corps knowledge.... The Corps Has)

Prisoner #8639-2, reporting back to my little gray cell.

 

The NIE and its uptmost importance to the Military

It is pretty understandable to state that with an ever changing battlefield the United States Military must constantly asses what needs to be done in order to support the solider in the field. Today this assessment is so imperative because of how advanced the military, and more importantly the world has become in terms of technology. In order for a military to have a successful logistical system it must be able to generate, transport, sustain, and redeploy necessary equipment, technology, and resources to its troops. By having the NIE in place this truly attacks the sustain pillar. As the committee evaluates the ever changing battlefield it is possible for them to create a response informing the military what they need to do in order to adequately support its troops. The Network Integration Evaluation or the NIE was put in place for this very reason.

The NIE meets semi annually to “inform the ways the army will field, train, sustain, and continuously improve capability acquisition and life cycle management” (Networking the Soldier). In history, the committee has meet four different times helping the military develop its tactical network capability in terms logistics and other aspects of warfare. The committee will test different systems (such as a weapon system, or vehicle, ect.) while using soldiers. From the soldiers feedback the committee then can manipulate the system to optimize it. The notable 10th Mountain Division recently received some of the output that the committee created in NIE 12.2 and 13.1.

Soon the organization will meet for NIE 13.2. One of the big questions that the committee is going to have to attack is the idea of cost. As we all know the Military is looking to cut back on its spending. What are the different ideas that the committee should take into account? Is there a certain point that cannot be crossed in terms of cuts when supplying out troops in theater? What are some optimal ways the committee could come up with in allocating technologies and resources to our deployed troops? The United States and its military is known for its ability to rise to the top in conflicts in the past couple centuries. The NIE is a valuable asset the United States as it continues to sustain and supply its troops with world class technology, gear, and resources.

Reverse Logistics in Afghanistan

 
     The Army's logisticians are highly regarded for their ability to efficiently and effectively push supplies to the front lines in support of the warfighter.  However, as supply requests become more and more expansive and the push-system of logistics is exacerbated, the amount of retrograde (residue and unserviceable equipment) begins to pile up.  This becomes particularly problematic when you consider the small operating facilities like Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and Combat Outposts (COPs) that have become the norm in Afghanistan.


     In Army Sustainment Magazine's November-December 2012 issue, Captain Donnahoe highlights how each brigade combat team receives approximately one million tons of supplies per month.  The development and integration of reverse logistics in the region has helped logisticians effectively dispose of equipment such as refrigerators, heating and air-conditioning units, air compressors and battle damaged vehicles.  Army Regulation 711-7 defines reverse logistics as a process through which unserviceable items are returned through the original supply chain for "credit, reworking, recouping, restocking, or disposal."



Piles of scrap items and unserviceable equipment decrease work space and

create hazardous work environments on COPs across Afghanistan.

    
     In the bigger picture, reverse logistics provides numerous benefits for the Department of Defense including the ability to endorse a cleaner environment through recycling and seek potential financial recovery of equipment.  This latter benefit is particularly important today as sequestration and budget cuts across the Defense Department will likely affect our operations abroad.  Statistics provided by the Defense Logistics Agency suggest that in fiscal year 2008 they were able to reutilize approximately $2.2 billion worth of equipment through DOD.  To accomplish this, logisticians are forced to develop logistics plans and supply chains that allow for daily supply pushes to outlying COPs in support of the warfighter while simultaneously icluding retrograde channels that promote the removal of unserviceable equipment from the battlefield.


     Logisticians in Afghanistan have worked to develop more efficient retrograde lanes in support of reverse logistics operations, particularly through the use of helicoptor landing zones.  This has helped units be more proactive in submitting air movement requests, improved in-transit visibility of material movement, and helps ensure no aircraft missions return empty handed.  In addition to reporting supply requests in an aquisition, request-based supply system, reverse logistics encourages units to also report their requirements for retrograde.  These requirements become the logisticians goals and builds a relationship between the provider (force sustainment) and customer (warfighter) where coordination is paramount.
              


Once retrograde requirements are reported and movement requests

are submitted, transportation and aviation units are tasked to remove

residue and unserviceable equipment from the front lines. 

     Reverse logistics has far reaching effects on both our current battlefield capabilities and our future combat effectiveness in Afghanistan.  Further developments in the field of reverse logistics can vastly improve the quality of life of soldiers, set up follow on units for success and maintain operating bases that are free of retrograde and waste.  In order to be successful moving forward, there must be coordination between both parties and each must respect the goals of forward and reverse logistics as a means of optimizing sustainability.    

       

Soldiers Search For Lost Shipping Containers In Afghanistan

              An article was released on the Army's Homepage about an interesting aspect of war that is usually over looked; the reacquisition of commercially leased shipping containers. Since their incorporation into military logistics during the Vietnam conflict, shipping containers have become a staple for units transporting equipment into theater. This is especially true in our decade long conflict in the Middle East given the massive amount of equipment that is needed to sustain a modern Army. 

              These shipping containers are not the property of the U.S. Army though, they are almost all commercially leased. As with any item leased it must be returned by the due date or the customer will pay hefty fees. To tackle this growing issue the 113th Sustainment Brigade was deployed to Afghanistan in support of the Joint Sustainment Command - Afghanistan's Mobile Container Assessment Team, or MCAT, program. The MCAT mission is to locate lost shipping containers (commercial and government) and reduce unnecessary spending and detention fees paid by the U.S. government to commercial carrier.

   

               One member of the 113th, Spc. Jeffrey Brewer, describes some of the most interesting uses for these containers; "They have become small shops, bridging material and bridges themselves, showers, latrines, offices, perimeter barriers, living quarters and the list goes on." This main problem regarding this issue are the massive amount of fees that compile month to month, such as those when you don't return a movie to Redbox. So far Spc. Jeffrey Brewer and his teammate, Staff Sgt. Tyler Isenhour, have recovered 82 commercial containers that were previously unaccounted for and worth more than $1,245,000 in government property and detention fees. 

               With media and the majority of the attention in war generally siding towards the front lines it is important to not forget about the aspects making all of those victories possible, the logistical pipeline. A pipeline that with the assistance of the 113th Sustainment Brigade is becoming more and more efficient each day. Maybe after a few more containers are recovered we can use those saved fees and finally buy the government more paper...

-W.C.