The past 12 years have been spent fighting an insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as multiple other efforts around the world against insurgent-like forces. This is the not the first time the US military has fought an insurgency and will not be the last. A common strategy for an army is to attack the supply lines of an enemy because it will paralyze the enemy and create a weaker enemy. An insurgent force would still have to rely on the concepts of GTSR (Generate, Transport, Sustainment, and Redeployment) to ensure their forces are supplied. As discussed in the Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, early stages of an insurgency may include criminal activity, theft from the government, or from external sources. According to FM 3-24, as an Insurgency develops and expands, logistical support increasingly relies on on external support providing the primary source of generation. This requires a supply network to get the external support from an outside nation through an extensive supply network. The Ho Chi Minh Trail is an example of a extensive supply network for an insurgency.
The Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam could not sustain themselves without supplies from the North. The Ho Chi Minh Trail was created as the transportation method for supplies generated in the north to reach insurgents in the South. This provided enough sustainment for the Viet Cong to continue the fight throughout the entire conflict. This extensive trail was traveled by foot and animal to get the supplies to the front line. It was very difficult to target for the US considering it was mainly in North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
FM 3-24 argues that "skillful counterinsurgents attempt to cut off the flow of supplies especially weapons and ammunition." A counterinsurgent needs to understand where the supplies are coming from that support the insurgency. If a counterinsurgent is able to disrupt the GTSR cycle for the insurgent, it greatly lowers their effectiveness just like conventional forces. The supply lines of an insurgency like the Ho Chi Minh Trail is a valid target but again is extremely difficult to target because of its routes.
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| A support battalion's motorpool is an example of the different capabilities a logistician has to utilize in the counterinsurgency fight. |
Counterinsurgents must focus on protecting their supply lines to ensure that the allied forces are able to defeat the insurgent forces. Attacking supplies is a very common tactic for an insurgency because supply troops are generally lower in security than combat troops. Major Michael F Hammond argues that the logistician should follow a sense and respond framework for logistics. This method allows for a logistician to plan precise logistical support for the war fighter. Utilizing different methods of logistics will be another integral part in defeating future insurgencies.
It is interesting to consider that insurgents must also deal with logistics in a similar manner that we do. GTSR is certainly applicable to almost any logistics scenario. Insurgencies, thought they are wars of political and social control, do require supplies and personnel. I think most people would be surprised to see from where and how the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan in the past 10 years have sustained themselves logistically. I'm sure that their supply networks and routes could be mapped out quite similar to those of the Viet Cong in the Vietnam War.
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