Pic of the Week - The Northern Distribution Network

The Northern Distribution Network and the PAKGLOC

From www.ricochet.com

 

A product of improvisation by intrepid logisticians, the Northern Distribution Network proved to be a vital alternative to the Pakistan Ground Line of Communication.  The recent developments in Crimea, however, show how this project may turn out to be a critical chip in the new "Great Game."

 

Want to read more??

"Not Only 'Containerspotting' - NATO's Redeployment from Landlocked Afganistan" - Heidi Reisinger

 

"The Northern Distribution Network and Afghanistan" - Kuchins, Sanderson, et al

 

"Nothing is Simple in Afghanistan" - Andrew Betson

The U.S. Army's Role in the Fate of the A-10

The A-10 Warthog is a unique and specialized close air support (CAS) aircraft that the Air Force has fielded and maintained since the late 70's.  The effective and devastating CAS the A-10 provides to troops on the ground has earned it a spot near and dear to the heart of many soldiers on the ground. Due to steep budget cuts afflicting the DOD, the necessity of this capability, as well as the effectiveness of other aircraft to fulfill the same mission is currently in open debate and could easily produce a books worth of commentary.

Rather than dive down that rabbit hole, the purpose of this post is to explore the interesting, if impractical, possibility of the Army procuring the Air Force's 300+ A-10's should they decide to retire them. When this potential is approached using the four stages of logistics (GTSR), the Army only has to seriously consider two of the four aspects should they take control of the A-10.

Generation:
The fleet of A-10's is already produced, the Air Force keeps repair and replacement parts on hand, and the munitions production is already in full swing. Many Army posts are already joint based with the Air Force, and others are home to aviation units that already have airstrips that can handle an A-10. The real issue comes from the generation of soldiers to support the A-10. The troops needed to operate and maintain them are already trained and working in the Air Force. If the Air Force decides not to transfer its Airmen into the Army, a foolish decision considering the looming troop cuts, the mechanics of the A-10 are not drastically dissimilar from that of the Apache, Black Hawk, or Chinook, and enlisted AIT could easily be tweaked to include the new platform. However, this is only a short term fix. In the long run, a new MOS AIT (or several) will need to be created, and the Army will need to develop it's own flight school for the A-10. Not a monumental undertaking, but a serious consideration, especially with a tight budget.

Transportation:
The Air Force already transports the Army's helicopters, and it's own A-10s, and the Army is already set up logistically to support CAS helicopters. Little if any change is needed in the realm of transportation.

Sustainment:
This is the area where the Army would need to focus if they were serious about taking over the A-10 platform. With budget cuts coming in fast, can the Army afford to take on another weapons system, MOS, flight school, and all of the new munitions the A-10 typically carries? The ordinance corps will need to expand its capability to support a new platform, and all of the new inventory items that entails. Air strips will need to be maintained, especially with the added wear and tear that jet aircraft put on them. For the Army, the sustainment of this new asset would be a serious consideration.

Redeployment:
This would be another minor factor in the Army's ability to adopt the A-10. Redeployment would be handled much in the same way that Apache units are, with the Air Force's help.

Overall, the Army would need to weigh the benefits the A-10 brings to the table with the added costs associated with introducing any new asset. Currently the Air Force has decided to maintain possession of the A-10, but should they ever decide to get rid of them, the Army is not far from being able to effectively integrate the A-10 into its logistical infrastructure.

Keeping Soldiers Safe Without Sacrificing Security

The Marine Corps has been testing a new semi-autonomous system that, although not yet combat effective, was used in an air base scenario in late January during the Marines' Integrated Training Exercise to successfully maintain the security of the area.  According to this article by the Military Times, the Mobile Detection Assessment Response System (MDARS) could soon be heading to Afghanistan.

Cpl. D. J. Wu / Marine Corps

 MDARS "patrols" the airfield by either roaming or by heading to predetermined locations as the guards operate from onlooking towers.  If a guard detects activity from beyond the perimeter, he can push a button and MDARS will go straight there to investigate further until a quick reaction force can pick up the threat.  This vehicle was developed under sponsorship of the Army's Product Manager Force Protection Systems at Fort Belvoir, VA and features various advanced sensors, like navigation lasers, daylight and infrared cameras, a radar that can detect an object nearly a mile away, and a 10,000 candle power spotlight.  Optional features include audio warning devices, non-lethal munitions, and light weapons, according to Pat Culliton who is the MDARS program managers with San Diego-based Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific.

The 2013 MDARS II production system

MDARS is even build to accommodate and be driven by a Marine, if needed.  Its long chassis leaves room in the empty rear cargo area for upgrades in the future, like a smaller robot.

The war in Afghanistan, for the United States, concerns the security of Afghanistan.  In November 2008, a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) deployed to southern Afghanistan to be responsible for the security in the given area of operations.  They were initially deployed with additional logistics and air support, then soon requested even more additional forces to assist them in the east and in the south. 

Perhaps if these vehicles were available to the MAGTF then they would have been able to reduce the amount of logistics and support personnel necessary to support themselves without reducing their combat effectiveness, according to the Tooth to Tail Ratio (T3R), as these vehicles could allow the soldiers to stay safe and to work more efficiently without sacrificing security.

Future Logistical Problems in Afghanistan 

 

According to David Pugliese at Defense News, Afghan military leaders express a great deal of resistance as the United States continues to reduce the number of troops and support in Afghanistan.  Despite the fact that the Afghan National Army is capable of fighting against their country's insurgency without any help, there are enormous logistical challenges that Afghanistan is simply not prepared for.

 

Over the past decade, the United States and other nations in NATO, have taken care of Afghanistan in terms of generating, transporting, and sustaining the nation's logistical needs and supplies.  In order to meet the goal of leaving Afghanistan a self-sustaining force, much effort has taken place to train the Afghan National Army to have the right maintenance capabilities to be able to sustain their force in the future.

However, according to a report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in 2012, The United States already reported that Afghanistan will not be capable self-sustainment in 2014. Their findings concluded that there are not enough Afghanistan personnel set in place for sustainment with the technical skill required to get the job done, there was poor oversight of sustainment projects, and there is a lack of organization with regards to accountability of equipment.

Despite having the right personnel trained in order to maintain their own equipment and meet the demanding sustainment aspect of their logistical challenge, there still remains the overwhelming fact that they are not able to generate their own military supplies, vehicles, and weapons, which Afghanistan is frankly not able to provide due to financial limitations.  According to the SIGAR report, $50.15 Billion was spent by the United States between the years 2002 and 2012 for equipping, training, and sustaining Afghanistan forces.  These finances were used to generate all military supplies and equipment over the past decade. 

 

Eventually over time, without additional aid, this 'friction' will cause the Afghan National Army to slowly deteriorate as the sustainment and maintenance of their vehicles and weapons will only take them so far without generating additional vehicles and weapons.  A similar situation occurred when all Soviet Union support and funding ceased in Afghanistan during their collapse in 1991.  The result of this was a near collapse of the Afghanistan military forces during the time.

 

There is always going to be friction that comes with logistical planning and executing, however, if any of those aspects become a bottleneck or in this case, cease to exist, the whole system becomes vulnerable.

 

 



From the Desert to the Delta: The Army Shifts Focus to the Sea

Since the onset of war in the Middle East, amphibious transportation and quartermaster units have been overlooked for Department of Defense (DoD) spending for the simple fact that there were very few areas where the Army’s “brownwater” fleet would have been either practical or useful. However, with the focus of the military shifting towards the pacific, the story is beginning to change. 

While the Army does own and operate various types of ships the glaring issue in the “fleet” is the rapidly aging ship-to-shore transport vessels, most notably the Landing Craft Mechanized, Mark 8 (LCM-8). This model of landing craft was put in to service in the late 1960’s and serves today as the Army’s primary means of delivering tanks and troops to the beaches. The LCM-8 saw heavy use during the Vietnam War and more limited use during the various conflicts that followed. When it was procured in 1967 the LCM-8 had an Economic Utility Life (EUL) of only 25 years and was expected to be replaced in 1992.

LCM-8 c.1972

It has been decided that it is high time that the army update its now 40 year old inventory. The reason why this update was a long time coming was simply due to the fact that there was no demand for more advanced ship-to-shore transportation methods in the mountains of Afghanistan. Kevin Fahey, the Army’s combat service support chief, remarked that “We really haven’t utilized [the ships] a lot. So if you look at our fleet, it’s really old, especially as we transition to the Pacific.”

Recently, the Army issued a request for information (RFI) to the private sector to find a viable alternative to this aging tech. The program, which has been dubbed the Maneuver Support Vessel-Light (MSV (L)), is still in the very early in the development cycle and private companies are still competing for the Army’s contract. Currently, the program is number two on the combat service support office’s priorities after the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program.

Troops working on the LCM-8

 The MSV (L) program's requirements depart from the old LCM-8 in a variety of ways. First, the MSV (L) will be required to maintain a high level of survivability, force protection, and have the ability to fight if the situation calls for it. The LCM-8 was simply a dedicated transport and its only focus was getting troops and supplies from point-A to point-B. Second, it will serve many roles other than simple transport. The MSV (L) will be called upon to conduct tactical supply, security, and or patrol missions in riverine settings. Finally, the MSV (L) will conduct both combat operations as well as multipurpose harbor work. These drastic updates are a response to the very dynamic nature of modern war. The DoD hopes that this program will fulfill the needs of many organizations within the Army, acting much like a waterborne Blackhawk airframe.

The high priority of the program gives away the DoD’s continued emphasis on future operations in the Pacific. For the unique problem of long shorelines and islands dotting the map, the Army needs this update in order to adapt to a new style of war. Rapid deployment of troops is paramount in beachhead or island-hopping operations. This new program will serve as a force multiplier and will greatly extend the United States’ ability to project power in the Pacific.

Logistics, Sustainment Challenge Afghan Army

As the Obama administration begins to withdraw US troops from Afghanistan, one of the United States’ main focuses is on training and supplying the Afghan Nation Army. With this in mind, the Obama administration along with decision makers within the Pentagon must consider how the US will put the finishing touches on the training of Afghan military forces, and what supplies and equipment to leave with the Afghans. In his recent article for Defense News, David Pugliese brings to light the struggles that Afghan military officials are facing in preparation for US withdrawal, and the security takeover of homefront operations by Afghan security forces. Pugliese states that Afghan security forces are currently equipped with a mix of US and Soviet weapons, which have been satisfactory in their fight against the insurgency, but are almost completely reliant on funding from other nations, namely the United States. With significant military funding cuts and personnel draw-downs, monetary support from the United States will become slim, which has potential to significantly affect Afghanistan’s ability to sustain their security forces. Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defense, Maj. Gen. Afzal Aman, states that one of their main weaknesses is a lack of air power, and that although they are training helicopter and fixed-wing pilots, the main issue is a shortage of competent maintenance personnel to sustain significant flight training.

Another significant factor that will affect the logistics and sustainment system, Pugliese notes, is the issue regarding the Bilateral Security Agreement. President Karzai has shown significant resistance in his refusal to sign the agreement, which would govern the continued presence of international troops in country. With the upcoming April presidential elections, many believe that Karzai will be forced out of office, and with that, the signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement by the new president. Despite the Obama administration’s plan to completely withdraw from Afghanistan, they are still considering the Bilateral Security Agreement upon the election of a new Afghan president.  

Textron-built Commando Select Armored Vehicle

As stated earlier by Pugliese, the Afghans are currently using a mix of US and Soviet made weapons, but where do they get their aircraft and ground vehicles from? Senior Pentagon officials decided that $1 billion would be spent on Russian built Mi-17 helicopters, which roughly resembles the Sikorsky-built Blackhawk, only slightly larger. The US has also promised to supply the ANA with 500 Textron Commando Select Armored Vehicles. Pugliese states that other sources of equipment supply have come from the Canadian Army, which has donated Humvees and Ford Trucks to the ANA, because they are simpler to maintain. Pugliese goes onto state that NATO has been very reluctant to supply the Afghans with western tanks and other complex vehicles because of Afghanistan’s inability to sustain maintenance operations on such complex pieces of equipment. 

This is not the first time that Afghanistan has had to deal with a withdrawing foreign Army. In a very similar case, the withdrawal of Soviet forces in the late 1980’s left Afghan forces with stockpiles of Soviet-built small arms that are still used today. The Soviet’s continued to supply the Afghans for some time after their withdrawal, however after years of providing a crutch to the Afghan army, the Soviets cut funding, and the result was dismal for the Afghans.

There are several concerns that NATO and the United States have considering the outcome of Soviet funding cuts in the 1980’s, but two stand out immediately from Pugliese’s article. First, today’s technology is much more sophisticated, and with more sophistication comes greater need for training. Currently, the Afghans are struggling to train their own forces at the tactical level with small arms and un-armored vehicles. Their ability to conduct satisfactory training on more advanced pieces of equipment seems highly unlikely.

Russian Mi-17

Secondly, once Afghanistan begins to be weaned of the American funding plan, Afghan forces will likely run out of munitions and fuel for aircraft and armored fighting vehicles. It seems that if Afghanistan got their wish, and received a fleet of advanced helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and tanks, these vehicles would quickly turn into inoperable pieces of metal. Afghanistan’s ability to sustain anything more complex and sophisticated than what they are working with currently seems impossible given their economic standpoint and ability to fund their own security programs. Until Afghanistan strikes gold, or opium becomes globally legal, it simply seems impossible for Afghanistan to sustain a sufficient “tail” to support a stronger and more complex “tooth.”