When Tanks Fly

Imagine a world where the reach, flexibility, and speed of the 82^nd Airborne Division were somehow combined with the firepower, intimidation, and muscle of the 1^st Armored Division. If you love America, rejoice, because that world exists and you are living in it. The Army has decided to bring back a capability that has been lost for nearly 20 years, the light armor airborne tank. In the years following our exits from Iraq and Afghanistan, the 82^nd Airborne will be relied upon to be America’s quick reaction force wherever and whenever they may be needed.  Army leadership has acknowledged this and realized that the 82^nd needs a way to bring more firepower and security for their troops to the battlefield without sacrificing their global reach. As awesome an idea as it is to bring back the airborne tank, logistically there are some issues that need to be addressed.

            First is the cost and time associated with developing, producing and buying a new vehicle to fill the requirements put out by the Army. With a tight budget, and the desire to fill this capability gap as quickly as possible, the Army has decided that the vehicle chosen will be an existing platform that can be bought immediately, rather than a new design project that could take a few years. Currently the Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS) is a strong contender.

            The next logistical consideration is how the addition of armor affects supply consumption rates. Tanks, even small ones, burn a lot of fuel and take a lot of heavy ammunition. The increased supply needs of an airborne unit with the addition of tanks are significant. In addition, the expeditionary nature of the 82^nd makes this large increase in sustainment requirements a serious consideration that must be addressed. The 82^nd Airborne is designed to be a light, fast and easily sustained force, something that would be changed by the addition of airborne armor units.

            The addition of tanks to the 82^nd Airborne is a great firepower and security increase for the division, as well as a huge psychological weapon to leverage against the enemy. The 82^nd has scared dictators off the throne before without ever landing in country, the addition of tanks will only add to the fierce intimidation leveraged by the 82^nd Airborne Division.

Posted for "Andrew J Carter"

Reducing Our Logistics Footprint

Recently, an article in the Army Times examined how the Army plans to reduce its global footprint at the same time it maintains pre-positioned "mountains" of supplies and equipment around the world in order to speed deployments.

Currently, the way these stockpiles are positioned implies that they are more static, impinging our ability to rapidly deploy to hotspots or disaster areas. This indicates that the costs of transportation from these global dumps to forward-deployed units is higher than it could be. General Odierno seeks to streamline this by moving away from the planning for conventional conflict.

As we move into an era of asymmetric warfare and face more insurgency and terrorism based adversaries, it makes sense that we have smaller stocks of supplies for our contingency forces. The way General Odierno plans to break these massive supply dumps up is into smaller unit-based sets. Instead of a unit deploying to a region, and then getting supply pushed to it, these smaller dumps would be pre-positioned with the units' major end-items already there, such that the unit itself can simply pick up its gear and move out.

This is also beneficial to the lowest end of the spectrum of conflict. In the case of a civil defense or humanitarian assistance mission, Army units can simply move to an area and begin distribution of life-saving food, medicine, and water; with all of this materiel closer than it was before, the Army will be more mission-ready and spend less on shipping.

Afghanistan Logistics after we Leave

Right now Afghanistan is able to "hold its own," in combat operations against insurgent forces, however, how long will that last once the United States leaves along with its logistics support?

Challenges faced by Afghanistan:
- Lack of industrial base from which to produce supplies
- Lack of developed/ secure transportation network to move the supplies on

As can be seen on figure one, the road infrastructure (http://mom.gov.af/Content/files/Afghanistan%20Road%20Infrastructure.jpg) system in Afghanistan, even under peace time conditions, would be barely adequate to transport forces, becuase it omits several provinces-leaving them unconected from the country.  This problem is exacerbated by the ongoing insurgency that Afghanistan is facing which means that these already insuficent lines of communication become even less sufficient due to security. 

While as Afghanistan is rich in natural resources, as can be seen in figure two (http://mom.gov.af/Content/files/Afghanistan%20Civil%20Aviation%20Infrostructre.jpg), Afghanistan is not lacking in terms of natural resources, rather they are lacking in industrial capablity to turn those raw resources into finished consumer and military goods.  Many people will find it odd that I place consumer goods ahead of military goods, however, when one looks at recent insurgencies within the region the pattern of lack of economic opportunties creating insurgents become apparent.  Thus if the state can increase its consumer good production these goods can be sold either domestically or internationoaly to help fund the goverment. 


The two major considerations that arent being taken into account are:
1- the Karzi goverment is corrupt
2- the concept of a nation of Afghanistan is not widely supported within the territoral boundaries of Afghanistan instead tribal loyalties often out weigh national priorities. 

A Plane, A Ship, and a Empty Gas Tank

During the course of the search for Malaysia Airlines fight 370 China has revealed a major flaw in its strategic logistics. They cannot refuel their own ships for prolonged ocean voyages. They have neither the refueling ships nor the refueling depots that countries like the US and Russia enjoy in our efforts to assert our power globally. The problem that this rising world superpower has run into is not unlike that of that of the American Navy during the late 19th and early 20th century.

China's lack of military ports around the south pacific severely limits its force projection capabilities.  http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/dam/assets/131002204730-chinese-aircraft-carrier-story-top.jpg

The search for MH370 has shown that while in peace time China is able to use its regional ties to refuel their ships for humanitarian purposes, should a conflict arise they would be in deeper trouble. One international relations expert at Beijing University said "the Indian Ocean search was an "exceptional" circumstance" and that China would need to continue to foster friendly relations in the region if they want to be able to project power in the future. 

If China were able to project a naval power throughout the pacific region this would throw the entire balance in the east out of order. But their logistical limitations will continue to hamper China's advance for the near future. While they have been able to refuel at sea as of 2008, they will never be able to project the needed power until their secure logistical support from friendly nations in the Pacific region.

Future of Joint Logistics Doctrine

One essential ability of the US armed forces is its skill at joint operations. In the past our army has evolved in times of peace while preparing for future wars. Crucial to that evolution is developing doctrine. During the cold war, the Army developed Air-Land battle doctrine that was extremely effective during the first Gulf War. Because logistics is the "foundation of our combat power. We must, therefore, continue to develop and refine joint doctrine that promotes the most efficient, effective use of all available assets. Adherence to that doctrine is the key to our success." Our forces fight together. Their logistical support should be synchronized as well and the doctrine for it should reflect that. Critical to developing this doctrine is implementing the newest technologies at our disposal. As the Air-Land battle doctrine implemented the new M1A1 Abrahams main battle tank and many other new weapons systems our new joint logistics doctrine must use the newest logistical capabilities available to us. Automation of systems is on the rise in our military. From surveillance to bomb disposal to drone strikes, machines are replacing soldier functions.

Next they will be resupplying soldiers for us. TARDEC and Lockheed Martin are looking to make supply convoys autonomous and are currently having initial success in the effort. Future joint logistics doctrine will have to reflect this and many other innovations to interact with other nations military forces. Our military is already conducting training missions to bolster the logistical capabilities of our allied forces. In September of 2012 the U.s Air Force taught the Air Forces of central African countries how to airdrop supplies for soldiers in the field. Continuing this trend, they should also be trained in our logistics doctrine should we ever operate jointly in order to minimize fragmentation. The more everyone is on the same page, the better our logistical ability will be to embody the five logistical characteristics of anticipation, integration, continuity, responsiveness, and improvisation.

Generation of a Giant

As the United States' military budget shrinks ever more, senior military leaders must consider what programs in the military must be either cut or reduced in size in order to meet the budget provided by congress. As part of the effort to trim the fat from their budget the Army decided to reduce the number of M1 Abrams refurbishments per year. The main plant for M1 Abrams production is located in Lima, OH. At the peak of its production in 2009 the Lima plant was refurbishing an average of 2.5 tanks per day. In order to enable this increase in production from their production levels in 2001 the General Dynamics poured  15.5 million dollars into improvements in the assembly line machinery. The company grew from 500 some employees in 2005 to around 1500 in 2009. But due to the Army's cutbacks in production they have been forced to draw back down to the 2005 workforce. This is not just in size, but the actual people from the 2004 workforce as union rules stated that layoffs would happen by least seniority.

Tank turrets ready ready for reassembly with the tank body in Lima, OH. Picture provided by CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/04/29/boehner.ohio.plant.closing/

 

 

The issue that this situation creates is one of potential generation problems in the future. While the next major kinetic war may be a decade away this draw down has major affects on our ability to wage such a war. This draw back is undoubtedly fiscally sound as we now have to youngest average vehicle age since the inception of the M1 Abrams thus justify the reduction in production. But, the severe drop in employees at the Lima plant means that in a decade we will likely loose many of those extremely experienced workers. This will mean that the new workforce at that time will not have the experience needed to rapidly and effectively increase production output. Because of the union rules we are going to loose production power in the long run which in turn limits our military power internationally.

If we accept that the military industrial complex is now integral part of our fighting force it follows that their diminished production ability directly affects our war fighting ability. The mantra of today's army is not unlike what it was in the mid 90s. We are going to be a smaller and more flexible army.  If we as a fighting force must be flexible so too must our industrial force. Both must be able to rapidly and effectively respond to any global situation. These workforce cutbacks do not meet that requirement.

You Too Can Be A "Jungle Expert"

JOTC Trainees

As the war in the Middle East is winding down the Army is transitioning to regionally-aligned units rather than having all units trained for combat in the mountains of Afghanistan. One of the issues surrounding the transition is that the new alignment forces units to break from their years of NTC training and focus more on the types of environments and situations within their zone of control. For the 25^th Infantry Division, this means going back to its roots. Since the majority of Southeast Asia contains dense jungle the division is restarting the Army’s Jungle Operations Training Course (JOTC). The Army deactivated its old training course in Fort Sherman in 1999 as Jungle-style warfare fell out of vogue. Maj. Andrew Lyman, commander of the Lightning Academy (to which JOTC is subordinate) remarks that “Our focus on the [Central Command area of operations] during the last decade and the closure of the jungle school in Panama created kind of a vacuum of experience, and this is an attempt to relearn a lot of the lessons.” In a new era where Pacific deployments are a reality for the 25^th ID and other PACOM units these skills are invaluable to their overall successes.

                The new JOTC will be a 21 day long course in Oahu covering topics like survival, waterborne operations, land navigation, and jungle combat training. All of these skills will be tested in the six day long field training exercise at the end of the course. The course is designed to teach PACOM soldiers that in the jungle they have two enemies to fight: the OPFOR and Mother Nature herself. SFC Dominick Johnson says that “You’re not only fighting the enemy, but you’re fighting the terrain; you’re fighting the weather. They say the jungle is neutral. It doesn’t fight for you, it doesn’t fight against you, but it’s tough.” When

adjusting from relatively easier terrain to conduct command and control due to enhanced line of sight to dense foliage the situation for commanders and soldiers alike becomes much more difficult.

JOTC "Jungle Expert" Tab to be worn by members of the 25th ID

                Due to the rigor of the new school, the 25^th Infantry Division is approved to wear the “Jungle Expert” tab on their uniforms, while other soldiers outside of the 25^th will leave with the tab as a souvenir. At this point in time 800 soldiers have completed the JOTC with 550 successfully achieving the “Jungle Expert” tab. This tab harkens back to the patch that was given to soldiers who successfully completed the Jungle Warfare School at Fort Sherman.

                Currently the school is only open to those soldiers assigned to PACOM and is tasked with generating soldiers who are masters in surviving in their new region. There is a possibility of the school opening up to the general Army public but as of now only the first few iterations of trainees from the 25^th ID are going through in an effort to solidify the curriculum.

For more information check out this article by Army Times: http://www.armytimes.com/article/20140505/NEWS/305050061/

US Forces in Poland

             As the United States continues to deal with the crisis in Ukraine, tensions with Russia have continued to rise. Recently the United States has deployed forces to Poland and throughout the Baltic for joint military training operations. The plan is for US Forces to remain until the end of 2014. In addition to ground forces, the United States is also in the process of sending several fighter planes in an air defense capability for the region. The United States will also be providing supplies to Ukraine as they recover.

            Since the beginning of the crisis, approximately 200 troops and several F-16s have been deployed to the region. While they are deployed in support of Poland and the defense of the region, these units will work to strengthen the ties between the two nations as well as conduct advanced joint operations and maneuvers. NATO resources, in the form of surveillance aircraft and troops, have also been deployed to the region. The USS Donald Cook has been sent to the Black Sea to assist in the operations as well. Canada is also sending aircraft to Poland to help protect their assets.

F-16s at Lask Air Base, Poland

 

            The ability of the United States to generate, transport, sustain, and redeploy forces to Poland and the Baltic Region is possible due to the immense support capabilities of the United States. The United States was able to quickly deploy forces and supplies to the Baltic Region and Poland due to their close proximity to the region from their bases in Italy and Germany. The ability of the United States to transport and rapidly deploy forces was also aided by their close proximity and friendless with many nations in the region.

            In order to sustain its Forces, the United States will be able to work with Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as they conduct their joint military operations. Currently the United States, NATO Forces, and international forces will be in the region through the end of 2014, where they will then redeploy back to their home bases. If other issues in the region should arise, the proximity of Poland to Ukraine will allow for a more rapid response from US Forces and NATO.

            The ability of the United States to rapidly deploy its forces in support of Poland and the Baltic region have and will help to build closer ties to the United States and hopefully discourage Russia from continuing operations in the area. As Russia continues to remain in Crimea and tensions rise, US Forces will be ready for their next mission, wherever that may be.

Future of Army Aviation could Reshape Resupply

Army Aviators met Tuesday, 6 May 2014 to talk about plans for a “Future Vertical Lift Aircraft” that is currently in the very early stages of development.  As the 1960’s Black Hawk, Apache, and Chinook technologies are starting to become dated, the Army is looking for a new airframe that will reshape the future of Army Aviation. 

Abe Karem: president of Karem Aircraft next to a potential
design of the "Future Vertical Lift Aircraft"

The Army is currently working with four vendors (Bell Helicopter, Boeing-Sikorsky, AVX Aircraft and Karem Aircraft, the Army) in the “initial design and risk review” process.  Some of new features would include increased “speed, lift, lethality, range, survivability, and low sustainment costs“.  There are also talks of a heavier version to replace the Chinook helicopter.

Like any helicopter, the “future vertical lift aircraft” would have the potential to take off and land without the need for an established airfield with the added advantage of increased speed and carrying capacity similar to that of an airplane.  Any open area with a flat enough surface would be ideal.  While the final design specifications are not yet complete, this aircraft could potentially reshape the way the Army thinks about resupplying out in the field.   Air drops are a fairly complex mission, with the possibility of supplies being lost or damaged due to missing the drop zone or failed parachutes.  An aircraft like the “future vertical lift aircraft” would significantly reduce the number of air drops type missions needed for resupplying troops and the complexity that surrounds air drop resupply missions, as the aircraft would simply land or hover above the drop zone for perfect accuracy.  

Increased logistical capabilities means increased military power and effectiveness, and is ultimately an extension of national power.  LT GEN James Barclay, deputy chief of staff, believes the most realistic timeframe for integrating the new aircraft into actual aviation units would not happen until 2035.  While 20 years does seem like a long way away, Barclay believes that it is more important to design an airframe that meets the actual needs of the Army to make sure that logistical capabilities are increased along with a number of other specifications.

A change in Army culture.

 

This blog is not about new technologies, increased budget for the Army or greater fighting capability. As a matter of fact, it is complete opposite. Since the glorious march across France and Germany back in 1945, American army has improved and changed a lot. One thing, however, has remained the same for decades, until recently. Culture of consumption is embedded deep inside the society, and it took a long time for the Army to start moving away from buying new equipment, to actually repairing it.

            1^st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25^th infantry division was the first one to step in the right direction. At the beginning of fiscal year of 2013, the brigade analyzed maintenance trends and class IX (repair parts) expenses and identified, that nearly $4 million had been spent over a 90-day period. The solution to this high level of expenditure came after wargaming to keep the readiness high and costs low. Brigade Commander’s decision was to bring field-level engine repair, tire assembly repair, and battery charging to the brigade level of resourcing and management oversight.

            The results were outstanding – within the first 90 days, savings in these three maintenance areas reached nearly $3.5 million. The details of what exactly was changed and how can be found in the article here.

On the greater scale, the shift towards filed-level repairs will start changing unit’s dependence on logistic support. In other words, based on GTSR model, sustainment of units is not as heavily dependent on their sustainment brigades. Everyone knows that Army cannot operate without logistics, but after this change, the gap between 1-25^th SBCT and their sustainment units grew a little larger. To an extent, SBCT can utilize local dealers to purchase parts and repair their own equipment. They also stressed the importance of increasing the qualification of individual soldiers and enabling them to attempt to fix broken equipment before asking for replacement.

Millions saved on replacements means that millions can be used for other purposes, like training, improving the quality of life or towards generation of new forces (based on GTSR model). Overall, it is a good trend that leads towards more efficient and responsible Army in the future.

 

Archer FH77 Self-Propelled Howitzer

The Archer FH-77 Self-Propelled Howitzer is a fully autonomous 155mm howitzer designed by the Swedish defense company BAE Systems.  It's an ingenious solution to traditional artillery machinery.  It reduces manpower, increases mobility and concealment without sacrificing precision and accuracy. 

What is truly incredible about the Archer is that it is a truly mobile artillery platform.  It is possible to fire the Archer and within seconds be ready to move to another location.  This kind of flexibility offers artillery units the ability to reduce manpower and accomplish the same mission with a much lower risk to people and equipment. 

The current cost of the Archer is quite expensive.  It is $4.1 million per unit.  A 155mm Howitzer, by comparison, only costs about $570k.  However, there are a number of costs to consider that don't play into the individual cost of the Howitzer which are covered with the Archer system.  First, men must be trained to use the Howitzer.  The cost of creating a field artillery soldier who can operate a Howitzer costs tens of thousands of dollars, and entire units will be dedicated to the manning of 155mm Howitzer cannons.  Second, the Archer is mobile by default, and is attached to a truck.  The cost of a truck must also be included for a Howitzer cannon, because it cannot simply move itself. 

The Archer platform is certainly expensive, but it offers in a consolidated package what requires multiple personnel and other pieces of equipment to do otherwise.  The trade-off of the initial cost for the improved mobility of the platform and cheaper cost to use it.  Additionally, supplying the Archer platform is simpler because the vehicle that carries it provides storage space for rounds.  This allows it to take supply with it wherever it goes, and it can be restocked easily.  Lastly, the Archer can be inserted and removed from the conflict rapidly, unlike an artillery company.  The potential firepower offered by a few Archer platforms put together would easily equal the capability of a field artillery company, with better accuracy, fewer people at risk, and significantly better mobility.

The United States has currently shown no interest in adopting this system for use, but I believe it would be a vital tool for moving towards a more autonomous and capable Army.  Investments in systems like this can reduce dependency on manpower, and redirect manpower for more complex tasks that computers are poorly suited for. 

US Army's Logistical System Upgrade

US Army's Logistical System Upgrade

Staying on-par with the Army of 2020

Ordering supplies, managing equipment maintenance, and maintaining accountability of what supplies units possess while deployed - or even while on training exercises - has historically been a very tedious yet important task. However, due to a new upgrade the US Army Europe is about to undergo, this logistical system is about to get a whole lot easier. After seven years of development, testing, and validation the Global Combat Support System-Army has finally made it to the field this past year.

In an effort to keep with the standards and requirements of the Army of 2020, the Global Combat Support System-Army will an enhance a commanders ability to conduct decisive operations by integrating their unit's property accountability, maintenance operations, and requisitioning processes into a single system that provides him near-real time actionable information to assess and improve the unit's existing combat power readiness.

Unlike the Army's current system, where each aspect of logistics is in its own separate accountability log offline, the GCSS-Army upgrade will possess a web-based capability. This will greatly increase the speed at which commanders can request supplies, send supplies, and gain knowledge on the stocks of supplies already deployed.

Outside of benefiting logisticians, this upgrade will also benefit soldiers in the field in a number of ways. Warehouses will no longer have time-consuming closeouts and will have improved forecasting and reduced customer wait times. Unit supply rooms will have a virtual picture of customer bins at the supply support activity, which reduces risk to soldiers by limiting the amount of movement around a battlefield.

Finally, GCSS-Army will be operating in conjunction with the General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS) in order to create a financial system of record that will integrate logistics and finance capability. This integration will greatly increase a commanders ability to have a greater picture of what is available, thus increasing unit readiness.

Squids Find New Ink

When naval ships transitioned from wind-generated power using sails to steam engine generated power using coal, they received a double edged sword. While the steam engine increased the speed of naval vessels, it also created a logistical burden that was not previously needed. By using sails to capture wind and propel the vessel, naval vessels could sail as long as the crew had the supplies to sustain daily life onboard. With the introduction of the steam engine, this was no longer the case. Since steam engines required coal as a source of power, vessels had to carry large quantities of coal to cross vast expanses of ocean. Navies would have to port and load more coal to continue vast distances across the globe. This new requirement created a logistical problem that navies face to this day.


The requirement of an external fuel source for naval vessels limits the reach of a navy and forces it to conduct naval operations within reach of  refueling capabilities. One of the greatest examples of navies limited operational objectives due to fuel requirements occurred in the Pacific Theater during World War II. One of the most famous naval battles between the United States and Japan occurred as a direct consequence of logistical needs, specifically fuel. The island of Midway is approximately half-way between the United States and Japan (hence the name). This island was of critical importance for both countries, as their navies needed a base to launch operations against the other nation. Possessing the island would give either navy a decided advantage in its operational reach in the theater.

Battle of Midway

 



Go Army! Sink Navy!

Fortunately for the United States Navy today, it may not ever have this problem again. United States Navy scientists recently discovered a way to convert seawater into jet fuel. Theses scientists at the Naval Research Laboratory extracted carbon dioxide from seawater while producing hydrogen. They then turned these into hydrocarbon liquid fuel. Most of the Navy's fleet use only oil-based fuel, except for some nuclear powered aircraft carriers and submarines. Having a fuel source always on had could potentially save the Navy much time by not having to conduct at-sea refueling processes. This enables the Navy to expand its operational reach while sustaining its operations. The Navy still has some significant problems, despite this emergence in new technology. The Navy is still weak in areas regarding offensive capabilities. The most prominent problem the Navy could not fix was acquiring any M1A1/2 Abrams Main Battle Tanks. The scientists are still frantically researching methods to make the Abrams fully amphibious but all efforts thus far were unsuccessful. The Navy completely gave up on trying to find any sailors with the mental or physical capability required of being a tanker.

It's 0045 and Navy still sucks! Boom!



HASC OKs $600B in 2015 DoD Spending, Nixes A-10 Retirement Plans

A-10 Thunderbolt II, popularly known as the Warthog

Earlier this morning the House Armed Services Committee “approved a measure that would authorize just over $600 billion in 2015 US defense spending and block plans to retire the A-10 attack plane” states John T. Bennett of Defense News. Earlier in 2013, the Air Force initiated plans to retire the ‘Warthog’ given substantial defense budget cuts. However, there has been significant pushback opposing the thought of ridding the military of the A-10, one of the most trusted and effective combat air assets. DefenseTech quoted Air Force Chief of Staff General Mark Welsh having said that the service needs to retire older, single-mission aircraft in order to fund newer projects, namely the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which will take up the A-10’s mission. Bennett goes on to note that the amendment to put a hold on the A-10 retirement passed with a 41-20 vote. The committee measure also poses a movement to stop the shift of Army Apache helicopters from the National Guard to active service.

F-35 Lightening II, or Joint Strike Fighter

This measure has numerous logistical concerns should the bill pass on the floor of Congress. First, with the downsizing of US military forces and combat operations winding down in Afghanistan, redeployment of the A-10 Warthog back to the United States as an operational, opposed to retired, aircraft will pose an issue for flightline space, fuel consumption, and pilot usage. The previous plan for retiring the A-10 was to wrap them in plastic (literally) and packed away, freeing up space both on the tarmac and in the budget, for the F-35. Secondly, the A-10 serves one mission: close air support. Due to such a specific mission and complex aircraft, the A-10 needs many hands on the ground dedicated solely to ensuring that these aircraft remain operational and able to support ground operations. With the mission of close air support becoming faster and more accurate in strike capability with UAVs and more mission diverse aircraft (F-35), the air force is keen on decreasing the personnel needed to sustain air assets that can fulfill the close air support mission. Continued operations using the A-10 would force more personnel and fiscal assets to be pumped into the program, and would take away from the development of the F-35. With a takeoff weight (51,000 lb) slightly heavier than the F-35, as well as half the range of the Joint Strike Fighter (1,200 miles), the A-10 would require more midair refueling missions, which leads to more Air Force assets being dedicated to Warthog operations. Compared to the F-35, which will take up the CAS slack left behind with the retirement of the A-10, the Warthog is much more costly regarding supplies and support personnel for CAS missions.

 

Logistically speaking, if the F-35 is fully integrated into the Air Force and US military operations, the Joint Strike fighter would be less costly and would improve the CAS mission as well as fulfill its other missions. This being said, the F-35 is still relatively new to the skies which pose serious fiscal concerns as research and development has been costly and ongoing. Considering sequestrations and the current draw down of the military, decision makers struggle to determine the cheapest and most efficient course of action regarding aircraft usage in the Air Force. Despite being slow, ugly, and very conspicuous, the A-10 comes with a trusted reputation of mission success and reliability. With a bombardment of pushback from the Air Force community and within Congress, it seems that the Warthog refuses to give up its CAS mission without a fight.

DLA moves towards more efficient rail practices in Japan

 The Defense Logistics Agency Energy Department, specifically the DLA Energy Pacific section, has recently completed its transition to 45-ton rail cars in Japan. Moving from the less-efficient 36-ton rail tank car, with some of these 36-ton cars being over forty years old, towards the 45-ton car will allow DLA to move more fuel at a time and move that fuel faster.

With Japan's Ministry of Transportation deciding in 2007 to increase Japan's national commercial rail speed from 75kph (kilometers per hour) to 95kph, DLA had to comply with these new regulations and, thus, had to modernize its equipment, with the introduction of more efficient and modern rail cars being the main priority. Over the course of five years, DLA phased out its old 36-ton rail cars and acquired the new 45-ton rail cars. DLA does not actually own these new rail cars but actually leases them out at a rate of 100,000 USD per month from a private company. DLA uses these cars to transport JP-8 jet fuel to its Yokota DLA station from its Defense Fuel Support Point (DFSP) in Tsurumi.


 Previously, the trip between Yokota and Tsurumi took two hours for a "convoy" of twelve 36-ton rail cars; with these new 45-ton rail cars, the trip has been cut down by 30 minutes. Although this doesn't seem like a significant achievement, this is an important capability gained by DLA. If DLA had to conduct an operation that required a large shipment of fuel to Yokota, DLA would be able to get fuel to forces on the ground even faster than before. Since fuel is a highly coveted and highly necessary commodity on the battlefield, being able to get more fuel to Yokota quickly will be an important asset for DLA's efforts in getting fuel to the warfighter. Rail always has and will always be an important and effective means of getting fuel, supplies, and troops to and from any given place; DLA Energy Petroleum Distribution Supervisor Army SFC Tomas Rivera Mendez voices this sentiment when he said in the article, "Rail tank cars are the most efficient method to move fuel to the warfighter in the central region of Japan."

With the United States Army in the midst of "pivoting" to the Pacific, knowing our fuel transportation capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region will be more important than ever, especially if a military conflict broke out between the United States and another country in the Asia-Pacific region (cough cough...China).
Link to article "DLA Energy acquires new rail tank cars"

Wind to Coal to Gas to Nuclear to.... Water?

The United States Navy operates around the world and is constantly on the move.  With almost 150 combat ships distributed around the globe this force requires a massive logistics effort to move and sustain it.   one of the heaviest and most expensive supplies delevered to these floating cities fuel. The typical destroyer in our Navy consumes about 1000 gallons of fuel per hour. 

 

The imperial expansion of the United States was fueled (pun intended) by the need to establish  points around the world to load coal and supplies onto a global fleet. Today, the United States Navy is filled with ships designed to resupply while underway at sea. Logistically, this is a difficult and expensive process. New technology, however, may be changing the way our Navy approaches this obstacle.

Recently, Navy researchers have developed a way to breakdown sea water into a hydrocarbon fuel that can power engines. This technology was recently used in a model airplane  as a proof of concept. Through the use of a catalytic converter, the seawater takes the form of a fluid fuel with a high energy return. 

The logistical impact of such a development is staggering. As Navy ships begin to use this method to power their engines they no longer need constant resupply of fuel from other ships. This will drastically reduce the resulting snowball effect. The logistics snowball is the idea that for ever piece of equipment or support needed to deliver sustainment there are additional supplies needed to sustain the sustainment effort itself.

By having ships that no longer require refueling the Navy can durastically reduce its costs. With the need for less fuel there will be fewer refueling ships necessary.