When Tanks Fly

Imagine a world where the reach, flexibility, and speed of the 82^nd Airborne Division were somehow combined with the firepower, intimidation, and muscle of the 1^st Armored Division. If you love America, rejoice, because that world exists and you are living in it. The Army has decided to bring back a capability that has been lost for nearly 20 years, the light armor airborne tank. In the years following our exits from Iraq and Afghanistan, the 82^nd Airborne will be relied upon to be America’s quick reaction force wherever and whenever they may be needed.  Army leadership has acknowledged this and realized that the 82^nd needs a way to bring more firepower and security for their troops to the battlefield without sacrificing their global reach. As awesome an idea as it is to bring back the airborne tank, logistically there are some issues that need to be addressed.

            First is the cost and time associated with developing, producing and buying a new vehicle to fill the requirements put out by the Army. With a tight budget, and the desire to fill this capability gap as quickly as possible, the Army has decided that the vehicle chosen will be an existing platform that can be bought immediately, rather than a new design project that could take a few years. Currently the Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS) is a strong contender.

            The next logistical consideration is how the addition of armor affects supply consumption rates. Tanks, even small ones, burn a lot of fuel and take a lot of heavy ammunition. The increased supply needs of an airborne unit with the addition of tanks are significant. In addition, the expeditionary nature of the 82^nd makes this large increase in sustainment requirements a serious consideration that must be addressed. The 82^nd Airborne is designed to be a light, fast and easily sustained force, something that would be changed by the addition of airborne armor units.

            The addition of tanks to the 82^nd Airborne is a great firepower and security increase for the division, as well as a huge psychological weapon to leverage against the enemy. The 82^nd has scared dictators off the throne before without ever landing in country, the addition of tanks will only add to the fierce intimidation leveraged by the 82^nd Airborne Division.

Posted for "Andrew J Carter"

Reducing Our Logistics Footprint

Recently, an article in the Army Times examined how the Army plans to reduce its global footprint at the same time it maintains pre-positioned "mountains" of supplies and equipment around the world in order to speed deployments.

Currently, the way these stockpiles are positioned implies that they are more static, impinging our ability to rapidly deploy to hotspots or disaster areas. This indicates that the costs of transportation from these global dumps to forward-deployed units is higher than it could be. General Odierno seeks to streamline this by moving away from the planning for conventional conflict.

As we move into an era of asymmetric warfare and face more insurgency and terrorism based adversaries, it makes sense that we have smaller stocks of supplies for our contingency forces. The way General Odierno plans to break these massive supply dumps up is into smaller unit-based sets. Instead of a unit deploying to a region, and then getting supply pushed to it, these smaller dumps would be pre-positioned with the units' major end-items already there, such that the unit itself can simply pick up its gear and move out.

This is also beneficial to the lowest end of the spectrum of conflict. In the case of a civil defense or humanitarian assistance mission, Army units can simply move to an area and begin distribution of life-saving food, medicine, and water; with all of this materiel closer than it was before, the Army will be more mission-ready and spend less on shipping.

Afghanistan Logistics after we Leave

Right now Afghanistan is able to "hold its own," in combat operations against insurgent forces, however, how long will that last once the United States leaves along with its logistics support?

Challenges faced by Afghanistan:
- Lack of industrial base from which to produce supplies
- Lack of developed/ secure transportation network to move the supplies on

As can be seen on figure one, the road infrastructure (http://mom.gov.af/Content/files/Afghanistan%20Road%20Infrastructure.jpg) system in Afghanistan, even under peace time conditions, would be barely adequate to transport forces, becuase it omits several provinces-leaving them unconected from the country.  This problem is exacerbated by the ongoing insurgency that Afghanistan is facing which means that these already insuficent lines of communication become even less sufficient due to security. 

While as Afghanistan is rich in natural resources, as can be seen in figure two (http://mom.gov.af/Content/files/Afghanistan%20Civil%20Aviation%20Infrostructre.jpg), Afghanistan is not lacking in terms of natural resources, rather they are lacking in industrial capablity to turn those raw resources into finished consumer and military goods.  Many people will find it odd that I place consumer goods ahead of military goods, however, when one looks at recent insurgencies within the region the pattern of lack of economic opportunties creating insurgents become apparent.  Thus if the state can increase its consumer good production these goods can be sold either domestically or internationoaly to help fund the goverment. 


The two major considerations that arent being taken into account are:
1- the Karzi goverment is corrupt
2- the concept of a nation of Afghanistan is not widely supported within the territoral boundaries of Afghanistan instead tribal loyalties often out weigh national priorities. 

A Plane, A Ship, and a Empty Gas Tank

During the course of the search for Malaysia Airlines fight 370 China has revealed a major flaw in its strategic logistics. They cannot refuel their own ships for prolonged ocean voyages. They have neither the refueling ships nor the refueling depots that countries like the US and Russia enjoy in our efforts to assert our power globally. The problem that this rising world superpower has run into is not unlike that of that of the American Navy during the late 19th and early 20th century.

China's lack of military ports around the south pacific severely limits its force projection capabilities.  http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/dam/assets/131002204730-chinese-aircraft-carrier-story-top.jpg

The search for MH370 has shown that while in peace time China is able to use its regional ties to refuel their ships for humanitarian purposes, should a conflict arise they would be in deeper trouble. One international relations expert at Beijing University said "the Indian Ocean search was an "exceptional" circumstance" and that China would need to continue to foster friendly relations in the region if they want to be able to project power in the future. 

If China were able to project a naval power throughout the pacific region this would throw the entire balance in the east out of order. But their logistical limitations will continue to hamper China's advance for the near future. While they have been able to refuel at sea as of 2008, they will never be able to project the needed power until their secure logistical support from friendly nations in the Pacific region.

Future of Joint Logistics Doctrine

One essential ability of the US armed forces is its skill at joint operations. In the past our army has evolved in times of peace while preparing for future wars. Crucial to that evolution is developing doctrine. During the cold war, the Army developed Air-Land battle doctrine that was extremely effective during the first Gulf War. Because logistics is the "foundation of our combat power. We must, therefore, continue to develop and refine joint doctrine that promotes the most efficient, effective use of all available assets. Adherence to that doctrine is the key to our success." Our forces fight together. Their logistical support should be synchronized as well and the doctrine for it should reflect that. Critical to developing this doctrine is implementing the newest technologies at our disposal. As the Air-Land battle doctrine implemented the new M1A1 Abrahams main battle tank and many other new weapons systems our new joint logistics doctrine must use the newest logistical capabilities available to us. Automation of systems is on the rise in our military. From surveillance to bomb disposal to drone strikes, machines are replacing soldier functions.

Next they will be resupplying soldiers for us. TARDEC and Lockheed Martin are looking to make supply convoys autonomous and are currently having initial success in the effort. Future joint logistics doctrine will have to reflect this and many other innovations to interact with other nations military forces. Our military is already conducting training missions to bolster the logistical capabilities of our allied forces. In September of 2012 the U.s Air Force taught the Air Forces of central African countries how to airdrop supplies for soldiers in the field. Continuing this trend, they should also be trained in our logistics doctrine should we ever operate jointly in order to minimize fragmentation. The more everyone is on the same page, the better our logistical ability will be to embody the five logistical characteristics of anticipation, integration, continuity, responsiveness, and improvisation.

Generation of a Giant

As the United States' military budget shrinks ever more, senior military leaders must consider what programs in the military must be either cut or reduced in size in order to meet the budget provided by congress. As part of the effort to trim the fat from their budget the Army decided to reduce the number of M1 Abrams refurbishments per year. The main plant for M1 Abrams production is located in Lima, OH. At the peak of its production in 2009 the Lima plant was refurbishing an average of 2.5 tanks per day. In order to enable this increase in production from their production levels in 2001 the General Dynamics poured  15.5 million dollars into improvements in the assembly line machinery. The company grew from 500 some employees in 2005 to around 1500 in 2009. But due to the Army's cutbacks in production they have been forced to draw back down to the 2005 workforce. This is not just in size, but the actual people from the 2004 workforce as union rules stated that layoffs would happen by least seniority.

Tank turrets ready ready for reassembly with the tank body in Lima, OH. Picture provided by CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/04/29/boehner.ohio.plant.closing/

 

 

The issue that this situation creates is one of potential generation problems in the future. While the next major kinetic war may be a decade away this draw down has major affects on our ability to wage such a war. This draw back is undoubtedly fiscally sound as we now have to youngest average vehicle age since the inception of the M1 Abrams thus justify the reduction in production. But, the severe drop in employees at the Lima plant means that in a decade we will likely loose many of those extremely experienced workers. This will mean that the new workforce at that time will not have the experience needed to rapidly and effectively increase production output. Because of the union rules we are going to loose production power in the long run which in turn limits our military power internationally.

If we accept that the military industrial complex is now integral part of our fighting force it follows that their diminished production ability directly affects our war fighting ability. The mantra of today's army is not unlike what it was in the mid 90s. We are going to be a smaller and more flexible army.  If we as a fighting force must be flexible so too must our industrial force. Both must be able to rapidly and effectively respond to any global situation. These workforce cutbacks do not meet that requirement.

You Too Can Be A "Jungle Expert"

JOTC Trainees

As the war in the Middle East is winding down the Army is transitioning to regionally-aligned units rather than having all units trained for combat in the mountains of Afghanistan. One of the issues surrounding the transition is that the new alignment forces units to break from their years of NTC training and focus more on the types of environments and situations within their zone of control. For the 25^th Infantry Division, this means going back to its roots. Since the majority of Southeast Asia contains dense jungle the division is restarting the Army’s Jungle Operations Training Course (JOTC). The Army deactivated its old training course in Fort Sherman in 1999 as Jungle-style warfare fell out of vogue. Maj. Andrew Lyman, commander of the Lightning Academy (to which JOTC is subordinate) remarks that “Our focus on the [Central Command area of operations] during the last decade and the closure of the jungle school in Panama created kind of a vacuum of experience, and this is an attempt to relearn a lot of the lessons.” In a new era where Pacific deployments are a reality for the 25^th ID and other PACOM units these skills are invaluable to their overall successes.

                The new JOTC will be a 21 day long course in Oahu covering topics like survival, waterborne operations, land navigation, and jungle combat training. All of these skills will be tested in the six day long field training exercise at the end of the course. The course is designed to teach PACOM soldiers that in the jungle they have two enemies to fight: the OPFOR and Mother Nature herself. SFC Dominick Johnson says that “You’re not only fighting the enemy, but you’re fighting the terrain; you’re fighting the weather. They say the jungle is neutral. It doesn’t fight for you, it doesn’t fight against you, but it’s tough.” When

adjusting from relatively easier terrain to conduct command and control due to enhanced line of sight to dense foliage the situation for commanders and soldiers alike becomes much more difficult.

JOTC "Jungle Expert" Tab to be worn by members of the 25th ID

                Due to the rigor of the new school, the 25^th Infantry Division is approved to wear the “Jungle Expert” tab on their uniforms, while other soldiers outside of the 25^th will leave with the tab as a souvenir. At this point in time 800 soldiers have completed the JOTC with 550 successfully achieving the “Jungle Expert” tab. This tab harkens back to the patch that was given to soldiers who successfully completed the Jungle Warfare School at Fort Sherman.

                Currently the school is only open to those soldiers assigned to PACOM and is tasked with generating soldiers who are masters in surviving in their new region. There is a possibility of the school opening up to the general Army public but as of now only the first few iterations of trainees from the 25^th ID are going through in an effort to solidify the curriculum.

For more information check out this article by Army Times: http://www.armytimes.com/article/20140505/NEWS/305050061/