Monday, April 29, 2013

Prepositioning Exercise in the Pacific



Last March, The United States Marine Corps and Navy conducted its annual training exercise Freedom Banner 2013 which displayed the expeditionary readiness of the U.S. military. This bilateral exercise took place in Subic Bay, Republic of Philippines and consisted of deploying a Marine Expeditionary Brigade as quickly as possible. Two key components of this exercise were the prepositioning of supplies and the rapid offload of cargo. 
Subic Bay, Republic of Philippines
Maritime Prepositioning Squadron III (MPSRON-3) of the The Maritime Prepositioning Force, which stands ready to respond quickly to anything from the buildup of combat power to disaster relief, supported this operation. The prepositioning of essential equipment and supplies throughout a region has allowed the Marine Corps to extend its global reach. The time required to react to a crisis is significantly reduced by prepositioning.
USNS Sacagawea (T-AKE 2)
Another exciting aspect of Freedom Banner 2013 is the use of the MV-22B Osprey as the ship-to-shore connector. This operation utilized ship-to-shore sustainment including the USNS Sacagawea (T-AKE 2) and the USNS 1st Lt Jack Lummus (T-AK 3011). MRE’s, fuel, construction equipment, ammunition, repair parts, vehicles, and generators were all be transported from the deck of the USNS Sacagawea to shore by the MV-22B Osprey. This was the first time that a III MEF Osprey conducted single and dual-point sling loads from a T-AKE. The Osprey was designed for expeditionary assault and has a cargo load of 20,000 lbs. It took less then 48 hours to move more than 270 Marine corps tactical vehicles and amphibious assault vehicles. The entire off-load of cargo usually takes three to four days.
MV-22B Osprey
This exercise demonstrates the readiness of the United States military to rapidly deploy anywhere in the Pacific. Advances in technology and doctrine have reduced the response time of rapid combat deployment, humanitarian efforts, and natural disaster relief. The ability to sustain a military force is an indication of national power, and Freedom Banner 2013 effectively expressed the United States' influence in the Pacific.

"What we wish, that we readily believe."
-Demosthenes

Sunday, April 28, 2013

Pic of the Week


 
C-27J Spartan conducts airdrop training in Yuma, Ariz (2009)

Army Fuel Consumption


Army Fuel Consumption

 
     The Army runs of fossil fuels, and on average the DoD as a whole can consume as much fuel as a small country. The heavy reliance on fuels has grown greater as vehicles have become heavier, and electronics in the war zone have become integral to the nation’s ability to fight. The following short article will highlight an area where the Army uses the most fuel; ground vehicles, and where it is attempting to save fuel; generators. Oil derived fuels accounts for around 80% of DoDs yearly energy consumption.
(Image 1)
     As wars have continued to be fought, the modes of transportation have changed from Personal Leather Carriers (Feet), to carts drawn by horses, trucks, and now APCs, MRAPs, and helicopters. As vehicles have gotten bigger and armor has been added, fuel consumption has also gone up to meet the power demands required to move them. At the same time, a highly digitalized battlefield requires that bases use large amounts of fuel to provide the necessary electricity for electronics. All of this has resulted in a rise in the fuel consumption of the Army, and other branches of service. On average, total DoD fuel consumption is around $13.3 billion dollars for around 932 trillion Btu. That is about the same amount of energy that Nigeria uses each year. That is a lot of energy.
As heavier vehicles have been added to the Army inventory, more fuel as been required to operate them. The HMMWC has a fuel economy of about 14 mpg. An MRAP, which is being used to supplement and replace HMMWVs in certain situations, has no base model to compare but on average has a fuel economy around 3 mpg. That’s over four and a half times worse than an unarmored HMMWV; with armor added the fuel economy of the HMMWV drops dramatically. The added armor and protection afforded by the MRAP is great on the battlefield, but hell for the logistical side of war fighting.




(Image 2)
     FOBs and major bases in Afghanistan utilize large numbers of small generators. These generators are used from providing power to recharge radio batteries, to powering computer and communications systems, to providing energy to cook the food, provide warm water to shower with, and to power the various devices used for surveillance and base protection. When fuel runs out, generators of lower priority (such as those used for non-mission essential items) will be switched off so that communications generators will be kept running until more fuel arrives. In order to help reduce the amount of fuel consumed now and save money in these financially tight times, new technologies are being used to reduce the amount of fuel used at FOBs and bases in Afghanistan. The Army began fielding a new generation of generators that promise to consume 21% less fuel than the current fleet of generators, and also claim to be 95% more reliable. This reduction across the board of generators can have great impacts on the Army’s fuel consumption, as these generators require less fuel more can be made available to the vehicles that go out on patrol each day.
(Image 3)
     These new generators will promise to reduce the logistical foot print in Afghanistan as less fuel is required for their continued operation. This will reduce the amount of fuel consumed by smaller bases, which in turn will reduce the number of trips by ground vehicle or airplane to provide supplies.

     Overall with the large amount of fuel being used throughout Afghanistan, the Army has to rely on ground transportation for areas with decent infrastructure, and airplane resupplies to regions with inadequate roads. The first method requires the use of a fleet of vehicles like the one pictured above (image 1) to transport the fuel. They require their own fuel to get to their destination, protection against attacks, and time to get where they need to go. The Army’s heavy use of oil and other forms of energy may prove to be a bigger problem down the line as money becomes stricter, oil prices fluctuate to extremes, and as fuel and energy requirements increase as vehicles continue to become bigger and heavier, and as more of the battlefield becomes electronic. If the Army can continue to incorporate new technologies such as the new generators and possible new domestic sources of fuel, it can cut costs and divert more resources to R&D for future operations.



(Unfortunately, I could not hyperlink to any of the websites. The program would not save correctly for some reason. Below are some of the sites used to talk about fuel consumption, the MRAPs HMMWVs, and generators)
http://www.dailyenergyreport.com/how-much-energy-does-the-u-s-military-consume/
http://www.army.mil/factfiles/equipment/wheeled/hmmwv.html
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/maxxpro-dash/
http://olive-drab.com/idphoto/id_photos_mrap.php
http://www.army.mil/article/87545/
http://www.army.mil/article/62082/

Links added by Marshal Davout

Friday, April 12, 2013

Difficulty in Changing Uniforms


Army Uniform Change Difficulty

The Army Combat Uniform (ACU) uses the pattern of Universal Camouflage Pattern. Anyone who knows about these uniforms knows they are not universal and suffer many flaws. The Army has replaced the use of ACUs in Afghanistan with MultiCam. This uniform does a much better job of blending in with the terrain.  However, due to costs and production constraints, Multi-Cam will only be worn by units deploying. This may change with the draw down in Afghanistan, but that has yet to be published. There are rumors of a new pattern and style of camouflage soon to be introduced. This will pose a major logistical problem during the transition.

            When the Army changed from Battle Dress Uniform (BDU) to ACU the process took place during the opening phases of Iraq. Units deploying used Desert Camouflage Uniforms (DCUs). The transition took time for the Army and had some implementation issues. Units transitioned as a whole and the Army would focus their supply of new uniforms to those units. This kept troops looking the same in units and did not detract from the professionalism. Soldiers are issued the uniforms and thus the Army had to provide several complete sets of new uniforms for the soldiers and then have plenty available to purchase by officers and to augment for enlisted who wanted more. Some were hurt by this change, especially those who had bought BDUs shortly before the announced change and never had the chance to wear them. With other transitions their might have been the possibly of sales, but when the entire military stops buying these uniforms and everyone tries to sell them the prices drop significantly.

            When a new uniform is introduced into the Army to replace ACUs (possibly the US4CES), steps will have to be taken to reduce costs. New uniforms cost money for the Army to issue and the time used to exchange uniforms.  Not only will the uniforms need to be changed, but so will all other items using the same patterns. Body armor, hats, helmet liners, boots, gloves, coats, jackets, carriers for ammo and other supplies on the body armor, and many other uniform items all must be changed with a change in camouflage.  All of these should be replaced at the same time to reduce intermixed uniforms.  When implementing a uniform change the army must also spend time creating new guides and posters regulating its wear. All of these changes require large purchases and time to implement.

            Different environments require different uniforms and this is another consideration in uniform supply. The jungle has different requirements than the desert or arctic environments. The Army must have a ready supply of uniforms for all environments in case of any contingency. Getting the uniforms to the right place at the right time in the right numbers will be a logistics nightmare on top of all the other logistical requirements, such as at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, not enough complete sets of DCUs were available and units had to wear mixed uniforms.